The modern literature on city formation and development, for example the New Economic Geography literature, has studied the agglomeration of agents in size or mass. We investigate agglomeration in sorting or by type of worker, that implies agglomeration in size when worker populations di¤er by type. This kind of agglomeration can be driven by asymmetric information in the labor market, speci…cally when …rms do not know if a particular worker is of high or low skill. In a model with two types and two regions, workers of di¤erent skill levels are o¤ered separating contracts in equilibrium. When mobile low skill worker population rises or there is technological change that favors high skilled workers, integration of both types of workers in the same region at equilibrium becomes unstable, whereas sorting of worker types into di¤erent regions in equilibrium remains stable. The instability of integrated equilibria results from …rms, in the region to which workers are perturbed, o¤ering attractive contracts to low skill workers when there is a mixture of workers in the region of origin.
Introduction
What are the driving forces behind the formation and growth of cities? This question has vexed urban economists for many years. Informal explanations have been o¤ered, but formal models of the important and ubiquitous phenomenon have proved elusive. The answers to this question have important policy implications, since the various models could feature equilibrium allocations that are e¢cient, or second best, or worse. Thus, it is important to know which model is prevalent in each case, so that appropriate corrective policy, if needed, can be applied. For these reasons, it is important to have both a variety of models as well as testable hypotheses to distinguish among them. It is unlikely that one model, such as the one presented below or that of the New Economic Geography (see the early work of Abdel-Rahman, 1988 , 1990 Fujita, 1988 ; Abdel-Rahman and Fujita, 1990 ; and the modern model development of Krugman, 1991, and Fujita et al 1999) , will explain the economics of all cities in all time periods. For example, Glaeser (1997, 1999) …nd that at least half the explanation for agglomeration lies in natural advantages of a location. Natural advantages are important factors at the historical initiation of a city, but market factors are what keep cities where they are and help them to grow after the initial natural advantages diminish. 1 It is generally di¢cult to construct equilibrium models of agglomeration. Studies of the formation and growth of cities are subject to Starrett's Spatial Impossibility Theorem (see Mills, 1967; Starrett, 1978; Fujita, 1986; and Fujita and Thisse, 2002, chapter 2.3) , namely that a model featuring a closed economy with no relocation cost, location independent preferences and production, and perfect and complete markets everywhere has no equilibrium where any commodity is transported. An implication is that there is no agglomeration of agents in equilibrium. 2 Various models, such as those used in the New Economic Geography, employ delicate combinations of agglomerative and repulsive forces to avoid the Theorem (by violating at least one of its assumptions) and to generate equilibria with cities and agglomeration.
The modern literature on cities has a focus on agglomeration in size. Hints about the sources of a broader kind of agglomeration can be found in data and empirical work. For example, Berry and Glaeser (2005) …nd that levels of human capital in cities have been diverging over time. In other words, more skilled and less skilled workers are agglomerating separately. 3 Combes et al (2006) …nd strong evidence that wage disparities between French cities are driven by sorting by skill. What is the explanation for agglomeration with sorting? Observations about two other phenomena can help address this question. U.S. Department of Commerce (1975) data show that over the long term, labor has moved out of agriculture and into other industries, thus freeing low skill workers from ties to land and allowing them to become mobile. Second, rising income and wage inequality have been attributed to skill-biased technological change (see for example Acemoglu, 1999; Berman et al, 1994; and Caselli, 1999) . The purpose of our work is to provide a model that is consistent with all of these phenomena. We show that asymmetric information in the labor market drives agglomeration of workers sorted by skill. 4 When mobile low skilled worker population rises or there is technological change that favors higher skilled workers, integration of worker types in the same location at equilibrium becomes unstable, while sorting of worker types into di¤erent 2 Or, alternatively, there is no equilibrium at all. 3 One common de…nition of agglomeration can be found at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/agglomeration: "bunch, clump, cluster, clustering -a grouping of a number of similar things; 'a bunch of trees'; 'a cluster of admirers'" Of course, we would like to add "a cluster of workers with the same skill level." 4 For our purposes, skills could be represented by human capital, as is standard in the literature, or by social skills, as in Blum et al (2006) . locations in equilibrium remains stable. Therefore, our model suggests that increased mobility of low skill labor and skill biased technological change causes the geographic sorting of workers by skill.
The basic elements of models explaining agglomeration of any kind can be stripped down to a two region framework, where there is no presumed asymmetry among regions. A geographically symmetric equilibrium is present, where the economic activity at every location looks like that at any other location. Models that succeed in generating agglomeration feature (another) stable asymmetric equilibrium where economic agents separate into two locations: one with large population and one with small population; see Krugman (1991) . These ingredients are insu¢cient to explain sorted agglomeration, since the population shares of each type can be the same in both regions. 5 Consider a separating equilibrium in adverse selection problems when there is asymmetric information in the market. In a separating equilibrium, agents reveal their types, and di¤erent types are separated by their actions. Can this separation by selection be one of the driving forces of sorting and thus agglomeration? We present a model that features classical asymmetric information in the labor market resulting in adverse selection. A stable equilibrium in this model has sorted agglomeration of agents.
We use a competitive contracting framework where there are large numbers of both …rms and workers; each worker can work for only one …rm, and each …rm can employ at most one worker. There are two locations and two types of workers, high ability and low ability. The total populations of the two types of workers are …xed exogenously. The high type dislikes work more than the low type; this conforms to the commonly used single crossing property. Firms have the same technology for production, regardless of location, of a single consumption commodity that depends on the skill level of the worker employed. They know the overall distribution of types, but the type of a particular worker is private information to that worker. The …rms compete with both potential entrants and …rms in the other region. A …rm o¤ers a labor contract that speci…es a lump sum wage based on hours worked; the latter is an indicator of type. We show that no pooling equilibrium, where both types of workers receive the same contract, exists. 5 Models with only one type of producer and consumer have no hope of explaining sorted agglomeration.
Our stability analysis performs a perturbation test on equilibria as follows. A small fraction of workers is pushed from one region to the other. New …rms enter into the region where workers arrive and o¤er new contracts. The perturbed workers decide whether to accept these new contracts or return to their region of origin and work under the terms of their old contracts. If for all perturbations, the workers want to return, then the equilibrium is stable. If the workers do not want to move back for some perturbation, then the equilibrium is unstable.
We assume that …rms in one region cannot observe worker behavior, in particular labor supply or type, in another region. 6 So if a worker is perturbed from a region that has both types of workers in equilibrium, the …rms in the new region cannot infer her type with certainty. These …rms can only use their beliefs, and these beliefs are based on the equilibrium proportions of types in the region of origin. Therefore, at an equilibrium where types are sorted, for example all the low types reside in region 1 whereas all the high types reside in region 2, then the type of a perturbed worker can be inferred by all since the region of origin is known and there is only one type of worker in that region in equilibrium. This is called a sorted equilibrium. This certainty about worker type can be exploited by …rms, and can render such sorted equilibria stable. In contrast, there can also be integrated equilibria where both types cohabit at least one region. Depending on parameters, an integrated equilibrium can either be stable or unstable.
Both the total populations of the two regions and the numbers of workers of each type inhabiting the regions will, in general, di¤er in a stable separating equilibrium, sorted or integrated. Stable integrated equilibria exist only when the proportion of mobile low skill workers in total population is small and the technological advantage in productivity of the high skill workers is small. As the exogenous parameter re ‡ecting productivity of the high ability workers increases, 6 Our work is a distant relative of the important paper of Fang (2001) . The major di¤erences include the following. First, our consumer choice, namely equilibrium choice of region, is not costly, whereas Fang's is costly. Second, Fang has a noisy signal, a test value where noise is essential, whereas the second consumer choice in our model, labor supply, is not noisy. (In Fang's model, if there were no noise in the test score, there would be no reason for the culture signal.) Third, Fang uses Bayesian Nash equilibrium, whereas we employ a stability concept natural in the spatial setting. The de…ning notion of region in our model is that worker labor supply is only observable in the region where they work in equilibrium. In Fang's model, the analogous notion would be that worker test scores are only observable among the equilibrium group of workers to which they belong (this is not the assumption of that model). Due to these di¤erences, the results from the models are qualitatively di¤erent. perhaps due to skill biased technological progress, or as more low skill workers become mobile, integrated equilibria become unstable and there is a transition to the stable sorted equilibria. 7 In this contracting environment, the assumption of the Impossibility Theorem that is violated is the assumption of perfect and complete (labor) markets everywhere. It is our hope that our work prompts further investigation of the importance of information asymmetry in the urban context. 8 Other models induce the sorting kind of agglomeration in di¤erent ways, though their primary purpose might not be to explain agglomeration. For instance, Konishi (2006) is a …ne example of sorting driven by local public goods in the Tiebout tradition. Mori and Turrini (2005) is a …ne example in the New Economic Geography tradition. Agent heterogeneity in and of itself is insu¢cient to drive sorting or agglomeration, as the Starrett theorem certainly allows heterogeneity. So the main driving force of agglomeration in any of these models cannot be heterogeneity.
We proceed to explain the reasons underlying a few of our modeling choices. A natural competitor to our model is a model of perfect competition that has a localization externality between …rms within a region. This externality could, for example, be represented by a Cobb-Douglas …rm production function where output is dependent on private inputs as well as the aggregate quantity of labor of one or both types employed in the region. If each type is complementary to only …rms employing workers of the same type in the same region, then separation of types is a natural feature of equilibrium. We wish to make three points about this alternative. First, in such an alternative model with or without land, the agglomeration of all workers in one location is also a stable equilibrium. Second, in the alternative model with land, the bene…ts from the localization externality are likely to be completely capitalized into land rents and thus passed on to the 7 This transition is similar to the comparative static transition in the New Economic Geography models due to population growth or a transport cost decrease; see Krugman (1991) . However, unlike the models of the New Economic Geography, our model does not use transport cost or product di¤erentiation. Instead, it features asymmetric information, adverse selection, and a rather standard competitive contracting environment. It is analytically solvable, in contrast with the models of the New Economic Geography (aside from those employing quasi-linear utility). 8 DeCoster and Strange (1993) provide an interesting model featuring asymmetric information and agglomeration. However, the underlying driving force for agglomeration is the presence of exogenous natural advantages of certain locations. landowners, provided that land supply is inelastic in each region. This would yield a large set of stable equilibria, with arbitrary population distributions. Third, our model is based on microfoundations, whereas the alternative is not, but the alternative model makes assumptions that in a not very subtle manner yield the outcome. One alternative to the competitive contracting environment that we have chosen is a purely competitive market framework, assuming that there are many participants on both sides of the labor market. However, asymmetric information in the form of adverse selection causes a breakdown of the competitive market for standard reasons. The low skill workers are the "lemons" in the labor market. Nevertheless, there are many agents on both sides of the labor market, so we use a competitive contracting environment. When we examine stability, there is another reason to consider a contracting model: there are few consumers (an arbitrarily small measure) and many …rms in the labor market.
The opposite of a competitive approach would be to assume that there is only one …rm in each region, and thus there is a monopoly. We expect that our results extend to this framework as well, though the assumption that there is a monopoly in each region does not seem as reasonable empirically as the competitive assumption. If monopolies were observed in regions, one would probably want to employ a large …xed cost rather than a decreasing returns production technology. Another alternative is to use monopolistic competition or oligopoly for the labor market, but these have the same drawbacks as the monopoly assumption and add further complication to the model. After all, we are trying to explain how asymmetric information can cause agglomeration in the simplest framework possible.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model and notation. In section 3, we analyze separating equilibrium, show that there are no pooling equilibria, and examine the stability properties of sorted as well as integrated separating equilibria. A general discussion of the numerical results, with a focus on the comparative statics in productivity of the high ability workers and in the share of the population of high productivity workers in the total population of mobile workers, is found in section 4. Section 5 provides conclusions and directions for future research.
The model 2.1 Notation
There are two regions in this economy indexed by j = 1; 2. There are two types of mobile workers in the economy, indexed by i = H; L. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor. Workers supply labor to …rms and earn a lump-sum wage. Workers are di¤erentiated by their ability (high type and low type). Their populations are denoted by N H ; N L 2 R ++ . A labor contract (w; l) 2 R + [0; 1] between a …rm and a worker speci…es a wage and a quantity of labor. Since workers can only decide whether to take the o¤er or not, but cannot choose a quantity of labor not o¤ered in a contract, there is no loss of generality in using a lump-sum wage.
If a type i worker accepts the o¤er (w; l) from a …rm, her utility is
Parameters H ; L 2 (0; 1), where H > L > 0, denote the marginal disutility of labor of the two types. For a given utility level, dw dl j u i = i . A larger i means a higher disutility from work and that wage or consumption has relatively lower value. This is the single crossing property used in models of asymmetric information, for instance in the vast literatures on optimal income taxation, industrial organization, health insurance, and education economics. As in these literatures, we presume that H > L rather than the opposite for the simple reason that the opportunity cost of time is higher for the high type workers. 9 There are a large number of potential …rms in both regions that will hire these two types of workers. For the convenience of analysis, we assume that …rms are 9 We do …nd that under the interesting circumstances when worker types are reversed as L > H , a pooling equilibrium may exist. In this case, workers can accept a pooling contract at a corner solution (w; 1): A deviating contract that attracts type H but not type L would be outside the bound of l = 1. Any contract with l < 1 that attracts type H will also attract type L. A deviating contract that attracts type L but not type H can be ruled out under proper parameters where the type L indi¤erence curve passing through (w; 1) does not intersect the type L production function at labor supply less than or equal to 1. If we assume L > H , we again obtain separating equilibria as the outcome; the analogous pictures and algebra yield a contract structure where the low skill type is at a tangency whereas the high skill type might not be at a tangency. A second reason we do not use this version of the model is that it predicts that the high skill wage rate (computed as an average over hours worked) will be lower than the low skill wage rate. small and one …rm hires at most one worker. 10 Firms have access to two types of decreasing returns to scale technologies. The high type technology requires high type labor while the low type technology requires low type labor. Each of the …rms commit to a production technology upon entering the market. If the …rm faces uncertainty about the type of labor they might hire, the …rm may adopt a mixed technology by choosing a probability mix of the high and low type technologies. That is, the …rm can play a mixed strategy over technologies. The output of a …rm is given by two cases: if a …rm adopts the high type technology and employs l units of type H labor, its production function is
where > 1 and 0 < < 1. If a …rm adopts the low type technology and employs l units of type L labor, the production function is
Parameter represents the technological advantage of the high skill workers over the low skill workers. Type H workers are of higher productivity and are lazier (due to a higher disutility of labor). Take the produced consumption commodity as numéraire. For a …rm that hires with contract (w; l), we discuss its pro…t function in two cases:
(1) When a …rm knows with certainty the types of the workers, its pro…t function takes the form
if it hires a type H worker with contract (w; l), and its pro…t function takes the form
if it hires a type L worker with contract (w; l).
(2) When a …rm does not know the types of the workers, given free mobility of workers, it can infer the probability of hiring a particular type based on the exogenously given proportion of types in the economy. The probability of hiring a type H worker is N H N H +N L . So …rms can adopt a mixed production function and have expected pro…t function
Firms maximize expected pro…ts over contract o¤ers. Facing potential entrants, …rms will earn zero expected pro…t in equilibrium.
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, workers choose the most preferred contract terms among all o¤ers. This gives us incentive compatibility conditions. In addition, all accepted contracts must give nonnegative utility to workers. These are voluntary participation conditions. 11 Firms maximize pro…ts, while taking workers' actions into account, by choosing among contracts that satisfy incentive compatibility and voluntary participation conditions. This is a sequential game where …rms move …rst with contract o¤ers and workers choose the best contracts.
The de…nition of equilibrium is formalized in a general way, allowing as many contract terms o¤ered in the market as the number of …rms. The actual number of contracts in the market in any particular equilibrium will be very small as we will see below. Finally, there is free entry in both regions; therefore, equilibrium expected pro…t is zero.
With free mobility of workers and free entry of …rms, location or region is irrelevant to the equilibrium concept. It becomes quite relevant when studying stability, since …rms cannot observe worker behavior, in particular labor supply, in the other region.
Let denote Lebesgue measure on R and let M [0; 1) denote the (Lebesgue measurable) set of …rms that enter the market; note that in equilibrium the measure of M is total worker population. All statements about …rms should be taken as almost sure (in other words, except possibly for a set of agents of measure zero) with respect to Lebesgue measure in …rms or consumers, appropriate to the context. As is standard in measure theory, we denote by "a.s." the term "almost surely." A contract structure is a set of active …rms and a triple of measurable functions, (M;ŵ;l;d), whereŵ :
Here M is the set of active …rms, (ŵ(k);l(k)) is the contract o¤ered by …rm k, andd(k) speci…es the region in which the …rm enters and the type of technology and labor it employs. Speci…cally,d(k) = (1; 0; 0; 0) means that …rm k enters in region 1 and employs the high type technology with the high skill type of labor, d(k) = (0; 1; 0; 0) means that …rm k enters in region 1 and employs the low type technology with the low skill type of labor,d(k) = (0; 0; 1; 0) means that …rm k enters in region 2 and employs the high type technology with the high skill type of labor, whereasd(k) = (0; 0; 0; 1) means that …rm k enters in region 2 and employs the low type technology with the low skill type of labor. Since technology choice is tied with labor types, we do not use extra notation for technology.
Let k 2 M , a …rm that has entered the labor market. For ease of notation, we denoteŵ k =ŵ(k) andl k =l(k). Let C be the collection of all contract structures.
Next we de…ne the pro…t of a …rm under a contract structure, and subject to incentive compatibility. Fix a contract structure (M;ŵ;l;d). For expositional purposes, it is best to do this using several cases, with our discussion embedded. Call the expected pro…t function of …rm k 2 M : k (M;ŵ;l). De…ne the …rms o¤ering contracts that are incentive compatible for the high type as
Analogously, de…ne the …rms o¤ering contracts that are incentive compatible for the low type as
. It is possible that either or both of these sets is empty. But since we will guess and verify equilibrium, in equilibrium they will not be empty. De…ne the set of …rms o¤ering contracts satisfying voluntary participation (VP) conditions as follows: 12
In contrast with standard mechanism design, here there are competing …rms or principals, so we must specify pro…ts, and thus which workers are attracted to …rms, before de…ning equilibrium. If there were only one …rm, then the distribution of workers could be an equilibrium selection rather than a piece of the de…nition of …rm pro…t.
In essence, the next step before we can de…ne equilibrium is to de…ne the pro…t of a …rm for any pro…le of strategies (contracts o¤ered) by all …rms. This is a rather technical exercise. Then we can de…ne equilibrium using this pro…t function, since we will then know pro…ts of each …rm under unilateral deviations.
Embedded in the exercise of de…ning pro…t for a …rm is a set of beliefs, one for each …rm, about the type of worker they will attract given the pro…le of strategies of all …rms. The appendix contains a complete and formal de…nition of a consistent contract structure, namely that when …rms calculate pro…ts given the contracts o¤ered by other …rms, they account for both the incentive compatibility constraints and the voluntary participation constraints in calculating the type of worker they will attract, and thus the pro…t they expect to generate from production.
Let n 1 H and n 1 L denote the number of type H and type L workers in region 1, and let n 2 H and n 2 L denote the number of the two types of workers in region 2. Notice that we use superscripts to denote regions and subscripts to denote labor types.
An equilibrium subject to incentive compatibility is de…ned as the following.
De…nition. An equilibrium is a consistent contract structure and a population distribution
(ii) Firms earn zero expected pro…t due to free entry: 13 almost surely for …rms k 2 M k (M;ŵ;l) = 0 (iii) Population distribution is feasible:
It would be possible to derive this at equilibrium from the free entry condition. In that case, one would have the …rms as [0; 1), with the inactive …rms using contract (0; 0). Then at equilibrium, if pro…t were positive for any …rm, another would enter and replicate its contract and location, contradicting positive pro…t in equilibrium.
Condition (i) simply says that given the contract choices by other …rms, any …rm is choosing a contract that maximizes expected pro…t. 14 Condition (ii) says that due to free entry, in equilibrium any …rm's pro…t must be zero. Condition (iii) features a Lebesgue integral, and says that in equilibrium, in each region and for each type of worker, the number of …rms that are active is equal to the number of workers, and that the sum across regions of the number of workers of each type is equal to the exogenously given total populations.
There are many possible patterns of equilibria; potentially there can be continua of them. For example, each region may have only one type of worker (sorted) or a mixture of both types of workers (integrated). Firms may o¤er di¤erent contracts to di¤erent types (separation) or they may o¤er the same contract to both types (pooling). We rule out unstable equilibria by a stability notion that operates by perturbing the populations between the two regions. 15 In the following sections, we will examine two patterns of equilibria: the separating equilibrium where there is only one type of worker in each region, called sorted, and equilibria where both types are present in at least one region, called integrated. Of the latter class of equilibria, the pooling equilibria where the same contract is o¤ered to both types is of interest. Various kinds of equilibria will exist for various exogenous parameter values.
Stability analysis
We conduct the following stability analysis on equilibria: 16 1. Disturb the equilibrium by moving an arbitrarily small fraction of workers from a region to the other. Given that the number of consumers moved is arbitrarily small, and the number of …rms that are potential entrants in the market is assumed to be large, even if there were no information asymmetry, the consumers are at an advantage relative to the …rms. Therefore, facing competition, …rms that enter will earn zero pro…t. Once the …rms make the contract o¤ers, we assume that one worker arrives at the new region at a time, and each is matched randomly with an entering …rm that has o¤ered a contract.
2. Firms take the workers' arrival as a commitment to working in the new region. In other words, they view the workers as captive. In contrast with the workers in the destination region who revealed their types in equilibrium, the perturbed workers can be of unknown type. Firms do not observe workers' labor supply in the region of origin, but they do know the equilibrium distribution of workers by type. Each entering …rm makes a contract o¤er based on this information:
2.1 If worker types are identi…ed at the region of origin, …rms will o¤er the …rst best contract for that type. In this case, consumers have no informational advantage over …rms, but they do have an advantage in that there are few consumers and many potential …rms. Thus, …rms will choose pro…t maximizing production plans given that they know each worker's type, but will compete until pro…ts are zero. This will turn out to be a special case of (2.2), in the circumstance where …rms know with certainty workers' types.
2.2 If worker types are not identi…ed at the region of origin, meaning that there is a mixture of both types of workers in that region, risk-neutral …rms make contract o¤ers that maximize expected pro…t. In this case, workers have advantages over …rms both in numbers and in information. An entering …rm will make an o¤er before observing labor supply or type, based on population proportions of types in the region of origin at equilibrium.
3. The equilibrium is stable if for all small perturbations, the perturbed workers cannot get better contracts than in their region of origin, where the region of origin is de…ned by their equilibrium assignment.
Signalling versus Screening
The di¤erence between signalling and screening models is in the order of moves of the game. For example, a worker might signal their ability by choosing a costly signal, education, moving before the …rm that hires them. Screening models have the …rm moving …rst, for example by presenting a menu of contracts for the worker to choose from.
We wish to emphasize that here we employ a variant of a screening model but with many competing …rms. Choice of location by consumers is not a signal, since it has no impact on equilibrium. The aggregate location choices of consumers do have an impact on stability of the equilibrium.
Both signalling and screening models are used in the literature. Screening models have been used in literatures on optimal income taxation, procurement, and insurance. Signalling models are often used in labor economics. However, there is also a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, that employs screening in the labor economics context; see, for example, Landeras and Perez de Villarreal (2005) .
For the purposes of our analysis, and in particular the notion of stability that we employ, there must be some residual uncertainty, conditional on the signal, about a worker's ability. This allows for screening after the signal. There are several reasons this might occur in the real world. The most obvious one is that education, a natural signal, is not a perfect indicator of ability, perhaps because it is noisy. It also might not be a good indicator of social skills, that Blum et al (2006) …nd to be important as a component of unobserved ability. Moreover, education generally is used for human capital accumulation as well as signalling. It would be hard for a worker to choose a scalar, such as education, to optimize both the signal and the quantity of human capital accumulation; likely it optimizes a convex combination of the two. Finally, it is possible that at the equilibrium of the signalling game, the two types end up pooled. In any of these cases, there is residual uncertainty conditional on the signal, and that will lead to wage dispersion in screening equilibrium conditional on the signal.
Characterization of Equilibrium

Existence and Uniqueness of Separating Equilibrium
There are two possible types of equilibria: separating equilibrium, where worker types are revealed by their contract choices, and pooling equilibrium, where both types of workers choose the same contract. We provide in this section a complete characterization of equilibrium contracts and show that at least one always exists. We present a few properties, namely necessary conditions, of the equilibrium contracts …rst. We say that a constraint, such as IC L , IC H , V P L , or V P H binds if and only if it holds with equality for a set of …rms of positive Lebesgue measure. Proposition 1. The following hold in equilibrium:
(i) V P H and V P L do not bind.
(ii) There is only one contract for each type of worker across locations and …rms.
(iii) If IC L (respectively, IC H ) does not bind, f H (respectively f L ) is tangent to a type H (respectively type L) indi¤erence curve at the equilibrium contract.
(iv) In a separating equilibrium, IC H does not bind.
Proof. See the Appendix.
For the next proposition, we require a couple of de…nitions to reduce notation. De…ne
so that e l is the best the high type can do with the production function mixed between the high and low types at the economy-wide proportions. Letl be the solution to Proof. See the Appendix. Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the equilibrium contracts with nonbinding IC L , and Figure 2 for the case when IC L binds. In these pictures, the horizontal axis represents labor supply whereas the vertical axis represents wage, output or numéraire. Only the separating equilibrium where …rms can Figure 3 illustrates why a pooling equilibrium cannot exist. De…ne t = N H = (N H + N L ). The di¢culty with a pooling equilibrium lies in the …rms' ability to propose a deviating separating contract that attracts only the more productive Figure 3 .
Please refer to
Worker types are identi…ed by their contract choices in the market. Types will not be pooled together at the same contract. Yet in a spatial setting, there is another kind of integration. Worker types can be integrated in a region or they can be sorted between two regions. In the next subsection we distinguish by their stability properties these two types of separating equilibria.
Stability properties of separating equilibria
Suppose a separating equilibrium has population distribution (n 1 H ;n 1 L ;n 2 H ;n 2 L ) :
n j L be the high type share of region j. There are two kinds of separating equilibria: a sorted separating equilibrium has only one type of worker in each region, i.e., s j 2 f1; 0g , whereas an integrated separating equilibrium has at least one region containing a mixture of the two types, i.e., 0 < s 1 < 1 or 0 < s 2 < 1. We examine their stability as follows. Proof. See the Appendix.
The key intuitions and implications of this result are as follows. For the purpose of simulations, we shall focus on the case of a nonbinding IC L . An entering …rm makes an o¤er to a perturbed worker before observing labor supply or type, based on population proportions of types in the region of origin at equilibrium. Risk neutrality on the part of …rms leads to their use of average production functions and average disutility of labor. Thus, an entering …rm o¤ers a deviating contract that maximizes expected pro…t under the average slope of the high and low type production functions and the average disutility of labor , where the average is taken according to the population of types in the region of origin at equilibrium. Furthermore, competition drives …rms' pro…t to zero. Stability analysis employs disequilibrium behavior of …rms and workers, in contrast with the equilibrium contracting behavior studied in section 3.1.
The sorted separating equilibrium is always immune to a perturbation of workers since all agents are fully informed, so contracts are …rst best. Firms will not o¤er a better contract to attract moving workers. In contrast, when a mixture of workers of di¤erent types is moved to another region, a …rm entering in the destination region will o¤er a contract based on its expectations. This may give the low type a contract better than the equilibrium contract, for the following reason. Consider an integrated separating equilibrium. When the share of the high type in total mobile population is large so that the deviating contract is very close to the high type equilibrium contract, it is not attractive to the low type. This is because the high type equilibrium contract is not attractive to the low type by condition IC L . So an integrated separating equilibrium can be stable. When the share of high type in total population is small enough, an entering …rm will o¤er a more attractive contract (w ; l ) to the low type. This renders the integrated separating equilibria unstable (see the illustration in Figure 4 ). For any given high type productivity , there is a critical regional high type share s( ) such that, for any smaller shares, integration of types is unstable.
Higher creates a larger di¤erence between the productivity of the two types. This allows entering …rms to o¤er a more attractive contract to the low type when integrated with the high type. Thus, when the productivity of the high type is relatively low, integrated separating equilibria can be stable. But when this productivity is relatively high, they will be unstable. For any …xed regional high type share s, there is a critical value of high type productivity, (s), such that a larger means integration of types is unstable. We will illustrate numerically these critical values next in Section 4. 
Simulation results
In this section, we illustrate with numerical examples the qualitative e¤ects of two key parameters, the technological advantage of high type workers, , and the share of high type workers in the mobile population, t, on stable equilibria. The equilibrium contract of the low type is …xed by their preferences and production function. The following parameter values are used in the computations: = 0:4, H = 1:2, L = 0:45.
Equilibrium
As takes a higher value, the high type production function becomes higher and more concave. It pushes both the high type equilibrium wage and labor quantity up. As a result, a high type worker enjoys a higher utility level. Table 1 shows a set of numerical results. Parameter takes values from 1:1 to 1:2. VP and IC conditions are satis…ed in this range. IC L binds for 1:201. To keep this section simple, we only consider < 1:201. See Figure 5 for a graphical representation. Parameter is graphed on the horizontal axis, whereas the values of the inequality constraints are on the vertical axis. Nonnegative values mean that the constraints are satis…ed. VP: thin, IC: thick, type H: dotted, type L: dashed. When exceeds 1:201, IC L binds, implying that the low skill type will be indi¤erent between the equilibrium contracts for low and high skill types. 
Stability
The share of the high type in total mobile population in a region and the technological advantage of high type workers both a¤ect the stability of integrated separating equilibria. As we have seen in Proposition 3, there are critical values of the high type share and the technological advantage parameter for which integrating separating equilibria are not stable. We analyze the parameter range where all integrated separating equilibria are unstable for all possible regional high type shares. It is convenient to use the highest of the two regional high type shares, and compare the highest high type share to the critical share. Recall that t = N H = (N H + N L ) is the economy-wide share of the total high type mobile population in the total mobile population. Actually, this share t is the highest value of the minimum high skill share of the two regional shares:
If one region has a high type share higher than t, the other region must have a share lower than t. Thus, the task is reduced to …nding the critical high type share in total population t such that, if t < t, then any integrated separating equilibrium is unstable. In order to discuss comparative statics with respect to t, it is convenient to introduce a large population of immobile workers of the low skill type in the background. These immobile workers can engage in agriculture, tied to land. Their presence allows us to discuss in a simple way how equilibrium changes when more low skill workers become mobile by switching to work in manufacturing, in particular resulting in a decrease in t.
For a …xed t share, there is a critical value such that any integrated equilibrium is unstable for > . Pairs of critical ( ; t) constitute a critical curve that separates the parameter space into two parts. For values above or t values below the critical curve, no equilibrium with integration of types is stable. The bene…t of a deviating contract for the low type (utility from a deviating contract minus utility from the equilibrium contract) is presented in Figure 6 (a positive value means integration-of-types is unstable).
A set of critical values ( ; t) are reported in Table 2 . Table 2 With immobile low skill workers in the background (say, working in agriculture), as more are released to become mobile, t shrinks and eventually only sorted separating equilibria are stable. When the technological advantage of the high type increases, the integrated separating equilibria eventually become unstable, whereas the sorted separating equilibria remain stable. 
Transition of Stable Equilibria
We illustrate the transition of stable equilibria using a concentration index = s 1 s 2 2 [ 1; 1]. The index represents the degree to which type H workers are concentrated in region 1 relative to region 2. When = 1, all type H workers are in region 2. When = 0, both regions have the same share of type H. When = 1, all type H workers are in region 1. A larger means a higher share of type H workers in region 1 relative to the share in region 2.
We can now evaluate at equilibrium for changing parameters and t. 17 When t is …xed and the technological advantage parameter increases from 1, integration of types is stable for middle ranges of . In Figure 7 , the shaded area represents the values of pairs of the productivity parameter and the concentration index such that the associated integrated separating equilibrium is stable. This range is diminishing as is larger. When passes the critical (t), any equilibrium with integration of types is unstable. Then only the sorted separating equilibrium is stable, and we have agglomeration. Thus, sorted agglomeration can 17 Let N 1 = n 1 1 + n 1 2 and N 2 = n 2 1 + n 2 2 . For a given high type share in total population t, any regional share combinations s 1 ; s 2 can be supported as a separating equilibrium (sorted or integrated) if the following condition is satis…ed: s 1 N 1 + s 2 N 2 = t N 1 + N 2 . Among this continuum of equilibria, those with s 1 ; s 2 (t; t) are stable. When is …xed and the high type share in total population t varies, we represent equilibria in Figure 8 . The shaded area represents pairs of high type share t and concentration index such that the associated integrated separating equilibrium is stable. For a large high type share t, integration of types is is stable for intermediate values of . As more low types become mobile, t decreases and for t t ( ), no equilibrium with integration of types is stable. Then only the sorted separating equilibrium is stable, and once again we have sorted agglomeration caused by mobility of more low skill workers.
Another way to generate similar comparative statics is to start with parameters so that IC L is initially binding and the economy wide proportion of high types is low, but then increase the productivity of low skill workers until IC L no longer binds. The stable equilibrium can change from integrated to sorted, whereas the equilibrium allocation changes from second to …rst best.
Conclusion
In this article, we examine whether adverse selection in a labor market with asymmetric information can be a factor that generates agglomeration. Agglomeration is de…ned in a broad sense as a stable but unequal population distribution between regions. If this is a consequence of sorting agents by type, then we call this "sorted agglomeration". We …nd that separation of workers by contract type is sustained as the only equilibrium outcome. There are di¤erent contracts for di¤erent types of workers in equilibrium. Workers of di¤erent types can be integrated in their equilibrium locations. When there is a large share of high type mobile workers in the total mobile population, integration of types is stable. An integrated, stable equilibrium features a similar mixture of workers in each region. When more low type workers are released from their immobility, integration of types becomes unstable. Empirically, this represents a shift of low skill workers from agriculture, where they are tied to land, to manufacturing, where they are free to move. Calculations of the authors from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, p. D 11-23) show that the percentage of the total labor force not in agriculture in the U.S. rose from 52% in 1870 to 96% in 1970. With a small proportion of high type mobile workers in the total mobile population, integration of types is unstable. Any stable equilibrium has the large population of low type mobile workers in one region and high type mobile workers separated in the other region. The technological advantage of high skill workers is also a key factor in the stability of mixed equilibria. If the productivity of the high type increases, integration of types becomes less stable. Given the same share of high type in total mobile workers, a larger technological productivity advantage of high skill workers results in the agglomeration of workers by type. So, given asymmetric information in the labor market, either increased mobility of low skill workers or increased productivity of high skill workers can result in separate agglomeration of workers by type, consistent with the Berry and Glaeser (2005) Extensions of the model include the following. First, land markets can be added and the functional form assumptions can be generalized. We expect similar results. In its current form, the transition to agglomeration is abrupt, as in early models of the New Economic Geography. We expect that, analogous to those models, the addition of land or amenities to our sparse model could smooth the transition. Our functional forms were chosen so that the model is easy to solve analytically. The cost of other functional forms would be more complex calculations; the cost of general functional forms could be no method to solve the model analytically.
The model could be extended to include more regions and more types of consumers (in particular, a continuum of types). More generally, heterogeneity of …rms could be added. If …rm types were common knowledge, then the results would likely be straightforward and similar. But if …rm types were private information, that would complicate the model substantially, since there would be two sided uncertainty in the labor market.
Extensions involving multiple periods and dynamic information revelation are possible but are likely di¢cult. In communities with small populations, our model might not be relevant because the type of a particular worker could be easily observable.
Further questions to be addressed include welfare properties of equilibrium allocations and testable implications. Evidently, in the case of nonbinding incentive constraints, the equilibrium will be …rst best, but when an incentive constraint binds, the equilibrium will generally be second best. We have presented some comparative statics that might serve as testable implications. In particular, it is evident from our pictures that high skill workers receive a higher average wage than low skill workers, so one can look for increasing wage dispersion for cities in a country over time, or larger wage dispersion for cities in developed countries in contrast with cities in developing countries. 18 To avoid unnecessary complications, and as is standard in the literature on mechanism design, we select a pro…le. It is a discontinuous selection, but again we will guess and verify equilibrium, so its continuity properties are not important.
. That is, when the …rms o¤ering contracts that optimize utility for the high and low types are the same, then a …rm in this set can expect the economy-wide distribution of workers. That is, if a …rm o¤ers a contract that optimizes utility for both types of workers, but contracts are o¤ered by other …rms that are as good for the low type but not as good for the high type, then the …rm expects only high types.
see Hunt (2005) .
and ([IC L \ V P L ]n[IC H \ V P H ]) = 0, then k (M;ŵ;l) = L ŵ k ;l k and d(k) = (0; 1; 0; 0) (if the …rm is in region 1) ord(k) = (0; 0; 0; 1) (if the …rm is in region 2). (iii.c) Finally, if a …rm o¤ers a contract that optimizes utility for both types of workers but other …rms o¤er contracts that are as good for only the low type, whereas yet other …rms o¤er contracts that are as good only for the high type, then the …rm expects to get the economy-wide mixture of work-
Proposition 1. The following hold in equilibrium: (i) V P H and V P L do not bind.
Proof. (i) Suppose a type H worker accepts an equilibrium contract (w 0 ; l 0 ) 6 = (0; 0) with u H (w 0 ; l 0 ) = 0. Thus, w 0 = H l 0 . By zero pro…t, f H (l 0 ) = w 0 and by concavity d dl f H (l 0 ) < H . We can …nd a new contract (w 00 ; l 00 ) by reducing the labor supply required by " < 0, so that l 00 = l 0 " and w 00 = w 0 H ". This new contract gives the worker the same utility (implying IC H ) but increases the …rm's pro…t. Note that (w 0 ; l 0 ) satis…es IC L and u L (w 00 ; l 00 ) = w 0 L l 0 + L " H " < u L (w 0 ; l 0 ), so (w 00 ; l 00 ) satis…es IC L . These arguments apply to type L as well.
(ii) We prove this for the two types separately. First, suppose there are two distinct contracts (w 1 ; l 1 ) and (w 2 ; l 2 ) o¤ered to type H in equilibrium, and u H (w 1 ; l 1 ) = u H (w 2 ; l 2 ). There are three possibilities: both …rms are certain about worker types and use f H , both …rms are uncertain about worker types and use the expected production function N H
or one …rm uses f H and the other uses the expected production function. Case 1: two …rms use f H . By zero pro…t, f H (w 1 ; l 1 ) = f H (w 2 ; l 2 ) = 0. There is a new contract ((w 1 + w 2 ) =2; (l 1 + l 2 ) =2) that is indi¤erent for type H (implying IC H ) and yields more pro…t. The new contract satis…es IC L since both (w 1 ; l 1 ) and (w 2 ; l 2 ) satisfy IC L . Case 2 can be argued the same way as Case 1. Case 3: One …rm uses f H and the other uses the expected production function. Using zero pro…t, it must be that f H (
There is a new contract (w 1 + H "; l 1 + ") for small " > 0 such that it is indi¤erent for type H (implying IC H ), attracts only type H workers, and increases pro…t. It also satis…es IC L .
Second, suppose there are two distinct contracts (w 1 ; l 1 ) and (w 2 ; l 2 ) accepted by type L in equilibrium. There are three possibilities: both …rms use f L , both …rms use the expected production function N H
or one …rm uses f L and the other uses the expected production function.
Cases 1 and 2 can be argued in the same way as Case 1 for type H. Case 3: Using zero pro…t, it must be that N H
There is a new contract (w 1 + H "; l 1 + ") for small " > 0 such that it is indi¤erent for type L (implying IC L ) and increases pro…t. It also satis…es IC H since both (w 1 ; l 1 ) and (w 2 ; l 2 ) satisfy IC H .
(iii) Suppose type H workers accept an equilibrium contract (w 0 ; l 0 ) (this is unique by property (ii) and nonzero by property (i)) and IC L does not bind. There is a small " > 0 such that contracts (w 0 + H "; l 0 + ") and (w 0 H "; l 0 ") violate none of the VP or IC conditions. If d dl f H (l 0 ) > H , the …rm can pro…tably deviate to contract (w 0 + H "; l 0 + "). If d dl f H (l 0 ) < H , the …rm can pro…tably deviate to (w 0 H "; l 0 "). So, d dl f H (l 0 ) = H . The tangency condition can be proved in the same way for type L workers and IC H .
(iv) Due to the single crossing property and property (ii), given that IC L binds, IC H also binds in and only in a pooling equilibrium. Since we are considering only separating equilibrium, IC L does not bind. Suppose we have a separating equilibrium with contract (w 1 ; l 1 ) for type H and (w 2 ; l 2 ) for type L and IC L does not bind. Therefore, a …rm hiring a type H worker has the tangency condition: f H (w 1 ; l 1 ) = H (by property (iii)). By the concavity of the production functions, u H (w 1 ; l 1 ) u H f H (l) ; l > u H f L (l) ; l for all l > 0. This means IC H cannot bind since w 2 = f L (l 2 ) by the zero pro…t condition. Proof. (i) and (ii) We construct the unique separating equilibrium contracts by utilizing results in Proposition 1. First, since IC H does not bind, the low type is always o¤ered a contract at a tangency. Suppose a …rm hires a type L worker with contract (w L ; l L ). By zero pro…t, (l L ) w L = 0 and by tangency of the type L production function and the type L indi¤erence curve, d dl f L (l L ) = (l L ) 1 = L . The equilibrium contract iŝ
By the concavity of f L , w L L l L > 0 and V P L is satis…ed. Second, since u L ŵ L ;l L > 0 and f H l L > f L l L =ŵ L , this particular indi¤erence curve passing through ŵ L ;l L intersects f H at a point ŵ ;l such thatl <l L . Thisl can be solved from zero pro…t:
then type H can achieve a higher payo¤ than ŵ ;l at a contract ŵ H ;l H such thatl H l . This is solved from zero pro…t, (l H ) w H = 0, and the tangency of the type H production function and the type H indi¤erence curve:
By the concavity of production functions, V P H , IC H and IC L are all satis…ed.
For part (ii), if d dl f H l > H , then ŵ ;l is the highest payo¤ type H can get under zero pro…t and IC L , since IC L binds. Note that V P H is satis…ed by concavity whereas IC H is satis…ed due to the slope di¤erence, H > L , of indi¤erence curves.
To this point of the proof, we have used necessary conditions for equilibrium contracts to solve for them. To prove formally that these are equilibrium contracts, we must show that there are no independent, pro…table …rm deviations. For part (i), this can easily be seen, for example, using Figure 1 . These are …rst best contracts. Any alternative contract o¤ered by a …rm will yield negative pro…t, or will violate a production constraint. For part (ii), we must ensure that there is no pooling contract that will give higher utility to the high type than the proposed separating contract. Calculations yield the weak inequality given in part (ii).
(iii) Suppose there is a nontrivial pooling contract (w; l) 6 = (0; 0) in the market that both types of workers accept with a high type share N H N H +N L . If a …rm can o¤er a di¤erent contract arbitrarily close to (w; l) that attracts type H workers but not type L workers, it can use production function f H instead of the average of two production functions. This brings more pro…t since the increase in production is a discontinuous jump. A contract (w L "; l ") for small " > 0 is that kind of deviating contract. A type H worker is indi¤erent between the deviating contract and (w; l), while a type L worker prefers (w; l), since u L (w H "; l ") = w L l + ( L H ) " < u L (w; l). Proof.
(i) Sorted separating equilibrium with nonbinding IC L : When the two types of workers are sorted by location in a separating equilibrium, …rms know for sure the type of a worker coming from a particular region. All agents are fully informed. Thus, when a worker moves to another region, an entering …rm o¤ers a …rst best contract that yields zero pro…t. This contract turns out to be that same …rst best contract that the worker receives in equilibrium.
(ii) Sorted separating equilibrium with binding IC L : In equilibrium, the contract for the high type is second best. When a high type worker is perturbed, an entering …rm o¤ers the …rst best contract. Instability is the direct result of the incentive constraint binding.
(iii) Integrated separating equilibrium with a nonbinding IC L :
The stability of an integrated separating equilibrium depends on the composition of its worker populations. When a small measure of workers is moved from region j to the other region, the …rms hiring the perturbed workers have expected output s j f H (l) + 1 s j f L (l) :
Since the workers cannot be distinguished, …rms will pay a uniform wage rate to all workers that equals the expected disutility of labor = s j H + 1 s j L :
Pro…t maximization determines the quantity of labor hired l : 
:
Integrated separating equilibrium with a binding IC L : Exactly the same calculations work when IC L binds, since the behavior of the high type is irrelevant. To see this, please refer to Figure 2 and apply the single crossing property at the equilibrium contract for the high type, (ŵ 0 H ;l ). Notice that if the perturbed high type workers want to stay in their new region, so do the low type workers. So the equilibrium is unstable only if the low type workers want to stay in the new region. Next, notice that if the low type workers want to stay in their new region, then the equilibrium is unstable by de…nition. Hence, the equilibrium is unstable if and only if the low type workers want to stay in their new region, thus rendering the behavior of high types irrelevant, and reducing the problem to the same one as with a nonbinding IC L .
(iv) Let This means @ ( ; s) @s j s=0 = ( 1) We have, for all s > 0, @ ( ; s) @ > 0
because < 1 and L s H +(1 s) L < 1. Moreover, for …xed s > 0, @ ( ;s) @ is increasing in , and thus is bounded away from zero. Notice, however, that @ ( ; s) @ j s=0 = 0
We conclude that ( ; s) > ( ; 0) if and only if is large enough.
